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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY - SUIT FOR SPECIFIC RELIEF AGAINST FEDERAL
OFFICERS - UNITED STATES NOT A NECESSARY PARTY- Plaintiff, claiming
right to possession, brought an ejection action in a Georgia court against
both the government officer in possession of the land and the United States.
Defendants removed the case to a United States district court1 and moved
for dismissal. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss,
holding that the court had no jurisdiction over the claim because the suit in
substance and effect was against the United States and the United States had
neither consented to be sued nor waived its immunity from suit.2 On
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, held, reversed, one
judge dissenting. An action in ejectment against one who holds land to
which plaintiff claims a possessory interest is not foreclosed because defendant possesses the land as agent of the United States and the United
States has not waived its sovereign immunity. Bowdoin v. Malone, 284
F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1960).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States, although
judge-made, has been considered to be an implicit part of the United States
Constitution.a Its early popularity4 is evidenced by the great rapidity with
which the eleventh amendment was added to the Constitution, thereby
giving the states immunity from suits by citizens of other states.5 The ex-

1 A civil action commenced in a state court against an officer of the United States
may be removed by him to the District Court of the United States for the district
embracing the place wherein the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1958).
2 Doe v. Roe, 186 F. Supp. 407 (M.D. Ga. 1959).
3 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321 (1934); see United States v. Lee, 106 U.S.
196, 207 (1882) (dictum). See generally Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARv. L. REv. 1060 (1946).
4 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907); The Western Maid, 257 U.S.
419, 432 (1922). This theory has been criticized because the prevailing philosophy in
this country is that the people and not the state are supreme. See Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pts. 5 &: 6), 36 YALE L.J. 757, 1039 (1927). A suggested
alternative basis for the doctrine is its use as a device to prevent the courts from running
the government. See Davis, Sovereign Immunity in Suits Against Officers for Relief Other
Than Damages, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 3 (1954); Briggs v. Light-Boat Upper Cedar Point, 93
Mass. 157 (1865).
5 The eleventh amendment adopted in 1798 abrogated Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (state officers not immune from suit by a citizen of another state).
See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 406 (1821), which suggests as another
reason for the popularity of the eleventh amendment the fear that creditors of the state
would seek to enforce state obligations in federal courts.
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tent to which this doctrine applies in suits against government officials, as
opposed to he United States itself, has never been entirely clear. However,
in at least three categories of cases it has been rather consistently held that
the court has no jurisdiction unless the United States is joined and consents
to be sued or waives its immunity from suit: 6 (I) cases in which, if specific
relief were granted, the net effect would be to collect money from the
public treasury;7 (2) cases in which, if specific relief were granted, the net
effect would be to compel specific performance by the United States of a
contract to which it was a party;s and (3) cases in which plaintiff seeks to
compel the sovereign to part ·with property admittedly owned by the
sovereign.o Outside of these categories the cases turn on a precarious
balance between protection of private interests and non-interference with
functions of government officials; however, the conclusion is rarely ex.plained in these terms. If the balance is weighted in favor of private protection, the result may be announced in terms that the official has acted
beyond his statutory authority10 or that he has acted to deprive plaintiff of
his constitutional rights.11
A third rationale - that the official has committed a common-law tort has doubtful status. In the leading case of United States v. Lee12 the
Supreme Court held that in an ejectment action against a government
official the United States is not a necessary party and that the action may
be maintained without waiver of sovereign immunity.13 A host of decisions
following Lee, including Land v. Dollar14 decided in 1947, impliedly reo See generally Comment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 466, 469 (1952); Note, 40 GEO. L.J. 289,
298 (1952).
7 E.g., Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945) (suit to enjoin Treasury
officials from stopping payment under one contract because of excess profits made by
plaintiff under an earlier contract, dismissed).
s E.g., Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918) (injunction to prevent Postmaster General
from annulling a contract, dismissed); United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S.
218 (1913) (mandamus to order Secretary of Navy to deliver cruiser pursuant to contract,
dismissed).
1l E.g., Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) (injunction proceedings against
Secretary of Interior to prevent disposition of certain government-owned lands, dismissed);
Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906) (suit to prevent Government from patenting
public land to Indians because land belonged to Oregon via congressional acts, dismissed).
10 E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197
(1922); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918); Carlson v. Washington ex rel. Curtiss, 234
U.S. 103 (1912); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908); American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109 (1902); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 152 (1900).
11 E.g., Georgia R.R.&: Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1952); Rickert
Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-60 (1908);
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518-19 (1898); Poindexter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 270, 286,
292 (1885); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 868-70 (1824).
12106 U.S. 196 (1882).
13 Id. at 220.
14 330 U.S. 731, 737-39 (1947). In an action to restrain the chairman of the United
States Maritime Commission and others from selling stock which they allegedly were
illegally withholding from the plaintiff and to compel the return of the stock to the
plaintiff, the Court held the district court had jurisdiction over the case because if defendants wrongfully held the stock they would be acting beyond their statutory authority
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affirmed the position that sovereign immunity does not extend to government officials who have committed a tort on the basis that an agent of the
Government committing a tort acts as an individual and not on behalf of
the Government.15 But in 1949 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp.16 assailed this exception to the sovereign immunity rule.11 The
Court purported to "hold" that "if the actions of an officer do not conflict
with the terms of his valid statutory authority, then they are actions of the
sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law... :•1s The
Court explained Lee as a case involving an unconstitutional taking of
plaintiff's land and therefore within the first exception to the sovereign
immunity doctrine, and distinguished Dollar as a case where the government official acted beyond his statutory authority19 and thus within the
other exception to the doctrine. This broad language in Larson suggests
therefore that if specific relief is sought against a government official who
has committed a tortious act the United States will be considered an essential party to the suit unless the official has acted beyond his statutory
authority or in an unconstitutional manner.20

or would be guilty of committing a tort and either violation would be sufficient to remove
the case from the shield of sovereign immunity.
15 E.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) (threatened deprivation of vested property rights in water); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926)
(trespass to property); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549
(1922) (conversion of property); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636
(1911) (interference with access to navigable water); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204
(1897) (wrongful withholding of land); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S.
165 (1893) (attempt to withdraw grant of right-of-way which had become vested property
right of the railroad). The vast amount of authority accepting the view of Lee lends
strength to the position that sovereign immunity should not be extended to a government officer who has committed a tortious act.
The statement that when a government official acts either tortiously, unconstitutionally, or beyond his statutory authority he is acting as an individual and not as an agent
of the Government is a mere fiction used by the Court to justify its decision that the
Court has jurisdiction even though the United States has not been joined or consented
to be sued. This statement begs the question whether sovereign immunity should be
extended to all acts of government officials or whether the courts in each case must weigh
the advantages to be derived from application of the doctrine against the private injury
incurred. See Davis, supra note 4, at 9.
16 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
17 But see, id. at 705-32 (dissenting opinion).
lSLarson v. Domestic&: Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 695 (1949). Despite
the strong language in terms of "holding," the decision actually turned on other grounds.
See text accompanying note 24 infra.
19 The language of the Court in Lee suggests that its holding was based primarily
on defendant's wrongful trespass to the plaintiff's property and not their taking of
plaintiff's property without just compensation. 106 U.S. at 220-21. The Court's distinction
of Dollar can be criticized in that the Dollar Court indicated it would reach the same
decision if the official had merely committed a tort and had not acted beyond his
statutory authority. 330 U.S. at 737.
20 See, e.g., Fay v. Miller, 183 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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The problem which faced the court in the principal case was whether
the language in Larson, in effect, overruled Lee.21 The court concluded
that Lee had not been so limited as to preclude an action seeking to oust
the government's agents from wrongful possession of land growing out of
their tortious or illegal acts.22 The result could have been brought within
the exception to sovereign immunity recognized in Larson - that the action
of the government agent in the principal case amounted to an unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's land.23 Alternatively, the court could have
avoided Larson entirely by limiting it to its facts and ignoring its sweeping
language. Larson involved a contract for the sale of government goods
and the action would have resulted, in effect, in a decree of specific performance of a government contract, an area in which it has been consistently
held that the suit is in reality one against the United States which cannot
be maintained without its consent.24 The court's disparagement of the
tortious conduct theory in Larson was thus unnecessary, but lower courts,
understandably, have not felt free to disregard it and indeed most have
followed the literal wording of Larson without deviation.2is
The resulting confusion calls for a reappraisal of the entire doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The apparent reason for the doctrine in modern law
is to permit the Government to function unimpaired by a multitude of
private suits against officials;2 6 but weighed against this must be the proposition that private individuals have rights of property and contract which
21 One court has taken the position that Lee has been almost completely overruled:
"[I]n my opinion, United States v. Lee has been severely limited by Larson, and with
the possibility of the landowner recovering compensation for the wrongful taking, there
may be no cases at all in which United States v. Lee will permit suit today." Jones v.
United States, 127 F. Supp. 31, 33 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
22 Principal case at 105.
2s The Court in Larson did not question the proposition that an action could be
maintained against a government official if his action violated plaintiff's constitutional
rights. 337 U.S. at 689.
24 There is a valid reason for denying a suit for specific relief against a government
official for his tortious interference with a contract since plaintiff may sue the United
States for damages in the Court of Claims. However, in the property cases specific relief
to gain return of the wrongfully held property is the only adequate measure of relief,
and that form of relief cannot be awarded by the Court of Claims. See generally Comment, 65 HARv. L. REv. 466, 471 (1952).
25 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nez Perce Tribe of Indians v. Seaton, 257 F.2d 206
(D.C. Cir. 1958); United States v. 706.98 Acres of Land, 158 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Ark. 1958);
Andrews v. White, 221 F.2d 790 (6th Cir. 1955), affirming 121 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Tenn.
1954); Hudspeth County Conservation &: Reclamation Dist. v. Robbins, 213 F.2d 425 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954); Arizona ex rel. Arizona State Bd. of Pub.
Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Stack v. Strang, 94 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y.
1950), rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1951); American Dredging Co. v.
Cochrane, 190 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1951). But see Archbold v. McLaughlin, 181 F. Supp.
175 (D.D.C. 1960); Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959); McKay v. Wahlenmaier, 226 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Farrell v. Moomau, 85 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal.
1949). See generally Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv. 683, 692 (1956).
26 See Block, supra note 3, at 1080.
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should be protected against impairment by government agents as well as
private citizens.27 The decisions prior to Larson, either consciously or unconsciously, interposed the doctrine of sovereign immunity in those cases in
which suit would have resulted in an undue restraint on the operation of
the Government. Larson itself was not inconsistent with this pattern, but
its sweeping language which cast doubt upon a basic rationale for avoiding sovereign immunity as developed in Lee and related cases, has posed
the threat of extending sovereign immunity to the point where the rights
of the individual may be unduly suppressed. It is reassuring that the court
in the principal case has concluded that the principle of Lee is still available for protection of private rights in appropriate cases, notwithstanding
what was said in Larson. But the apparent inconsistencies between the
theory of Lee and the language of Larson will doubtless continue to plague
the lower courts until the Supreme Court clarifies the latter or reappraises
the entire doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Steven P. Davis

27 See Note, 23 So. CAL

L. REv. 258, 260 (1950).

